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Many belief change formalisms employ plausibility orderings over the set of possible
worlds to determine how the beliefs of an agent ought to be modiﬁed after the receipt
of a new epistemic input. While most such possible world semantics rely on a single
ordering, we investigate the use of an additional preference ordering—representing, for
instance, the epistemic context the agent ﬁnds itself in—to guide the process of belief
change. We show that the resultant formalism provides a unifying semantics for a wide
variety of belief change operators. By varying the conditions placed on the second ordering,
different families of known belief change operators can be captured, including AGM belief
contraction and revision, Rott and Pagnucco’s severe withdrawal, the systematic withdrawal
of Meyer et al., as well as the linear liberation and σ -liberation operators of Booth et al.
Our approach also identiﬁes novel classes of belief change operators worthy of further
investigation.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Current formalisms in belief change [2,3] typically employ either a plausibility ordering [4,5] over the set of possible
worlds, or an epistemic entrenchment ordering [2] over the set of sentences in an agent’s belief set. Operators for change
are then deﬁned by manipulation of these orderings after receipt of a new epistemic input. There are many advantages to
these approaches—foremost amongst them the guarantee that change will be effected in a principled manner, the provi-
sion of an intuitively plausible construction, and a formalism ﬂexible enough to accommodate alternative change strategies
and iteration. However, some nuances of belief change are not captured in such an approach. For instance, agents do not
usually employ one ﬁxed ordering throughout. Often, different orderings might be used in different contexts such as those
requiring greater caution or skepticism; or different orderings might be used based on the assessed reliability of the source
of the epistemic inputs. Such a critique is implicit in the work of Cantwell [6] where the notion of eligibility adds an extra
dimension to belief change. A technical framework that provides tools for belief change operations based on multiple order-
ings was proposed by Andreka et al. [7] where combination operations for a class of preference relations P are studied in
terms of an additional guiding preference relation. In our current approach, the formalism for belief change (in particular
belief removal) we present can be considered to be a special case of the work of Andreka et al. with  (over the set of
interpretations) being the single preference relation in P , and  (our additional dimension) being the guiding relation.
✩ This is an expanded version of a paper initially appearing in Booth et al. (2004) [1].
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: richard.booth@uni.lu (R. Booth), schopra@sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu (S. Chopra), tommie.meyer@meraka.org.za (T. Meyer),
aditya@uow.edu.au (A. Ghose).
1 Also aﬃliated to Mahasarakham University, Thailand, as Adjunct Lecturer.0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.001
1340 R. Booth et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1339–1368An intuitive way to understand the second ordering on the set of possible worlds is to think of it as a more stringent
assessment of the plausibility of states of affairs. Most rational agents are aware of certain contexts within which their
reasoning plays out—certain contexts call for a different assessment of plausibility. For example, while I am moderately
sceptical in vetting news reports of the generic kind, I adopt a more critical stance when vetting news reports of the
more serious kind, say concerning the impending declaration of a war. Such a treatment is reminiscent of contextualist
assessments of epistemic statements [8] where it is understood that agents make knowledge claims relative to some implicit
standard for assessing that claim and that different standards will induce differing assessments of the truth of epistemic
claims. The contribution of this paper is the uniﬁcation, in a single formal framework, of a large class of belief change
operators by a method that employs two preference orderings over the set of possible worlds. It enables us to view belief
change as the manipulation, by the agent, of assessments of plausibility of epistemic states of affairs in different contexts.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After laying down some technical preliminaries, in Section 2 we establish the foun-
dations of our framework for removal with a semantic deﬁnition and an axiomatic characterisation. The formal deﬁnition of
removal provided here allows us to show how this framework can be used to perform belief change in different contexts.
In Section 3 we study the class of belief removal operators obtained when the second ordering  is transitive. Section 4
builds up to a characterisation of AGM contraction [9] via sub-classes of belief removal operators satisfying the standard
properties known as Vacuity, Inclusion and Recovery. Section 5 shows that important classes of belief liberation operators
[10] can be captured in our framework. Section 6 isolates various classes of removal operators related to, and including,
systematic withdrawal [11]. Section 7 shows that the limiting cases correspond to AGM revision [9] and severe withdrawal
[12], while Section 9 concludes with some pointers to future work. Finally, the formal proofs of all results are collated in
Appendices A–F at the end of the paper.
We assume a ﬁnitely generated propositional language L equipped with the usual constants, boolean operators and a
classical Tarskian consequence relation Cn. Although the ﬁniteness assumption is a limitation, it is often made in the context
of logic-based Artiﬁcial Intelligence (cf. [5,13]) when (i) it does not detract from the basic principles being investigated, and
(ii) it ensures that the proofs are simpliﬁed considerably. Both conditions are applicable here. The interested reader is also
referred to the work of Gabbay and Schlechta [14] where the initial version of the work presented here [1] is extended to
the inﬁnite case.
An interpretation (or possible world) w is a function from the set of propositional variables of L to the set {0,1}, with
0 denoting falsity, and 1 denoting truth. W denotes the set of all possible worlds/interpretations of L. Logical entailment
is denoted by  and logical equivalence by ≡. For any set of sentences A ⊆ L, [A] denotes the set of worlds satisfying all
members of A (writing [φ] rather than [{φ}] for the singleton case). For a set S ⊆ W , Th(S) is the set of sentences true in
all worlds in S . The object which undergoes change will be K , a consistent belief set (i.e., a deductively closed, consistent
set of sentences). We take K to be arbitrary but ﬁxed throughout. For any belief set K ′ and φ ∈ L, K ′ + φ will denote the
expansion of K ′ by φ, i.e., K ′ + φ = Cn(K ′ ∪ {φ}). Given a total pre-order (i.e., a transitive, connected relation)  on W and
S ⊆ W , min(S,) will denote the set of -minimal elements of S .
1.1. Removal operators
We assume that for all removal operators , K  φ is only deﬁned for non-tautologous propositions and refer to the
set of non-tautologous members of L as L∗ . The limiting case requires only a minor emendation. We make this choice for
ease of technical presentation. We refer to these as removal operators because their use results in an epistemic input φ
being removed from the belief set. However, as we shall see in Section 7, the extreme case where the removal of a belief
φ results in the addition of ¬φ is included in the framework. In this paper, the following four properties will be considered
as fundamental to any reasonable notion of belief removal:
(B1) K  φ = Cn(K  φ)
(B2) φ /∈ K  φ
(B3) If φ1 ≡ φ2 then K  φ1 = K  φ2
(B4) K  ⊥ = K
Rules (B1)–(B3) belong to the six basic AGM contraction postulates [9]. Rule (B4) is a weakened version—under our assumption
that K is consistent—of another, (Vacuity).
Deﬁnition 1. A removal operator ( for K ) is any operator satisfying (B1)–(B4).
2. Basic removal
We now set up our most general semantic construction of belief change operators. Our goal is to take full AGM contrac-
tion as a starting point, i.e. belief contraction operators adhering to the eight AGM contraction postulates, including the two
so-called supplementary AGM contraction postulates [9]. In line with this goal we assume a total pre-order  anchored on
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the ordering assessed as more plausible. In what follows, ∼ will always denote the symmetric closure of , i.e., w1 ∼ w2
iff both w1  w2 and w2  w1.
In order to generalise full AGM contraction, we assume we are also given a second binary relation  on W . The only
requirement we place on , at least initially, is that it is a reﬂexive sub-relation of . These two orderings provide the
context in which an agent makes changes to its current beliefs. Intuitively,  is intended to serve as an aid to the ﬁrst
ordering  in the provision of the context in which belief change should occur. This explains why  is required to be a
sub-relation of . In the process of providing such a context, the role of  will be to relate relevant worlds to one another
(see Section 2.2). This justiﬁes the requirement of  to be reﬂexive: every world is at least relevant to itself.
Deﬁnition 2. (,) is a K-context iff  is a total pre-order (on W) anchored on [K ], and  is a reﬂexive sub-relation of .
The following picture shows what a K -structure looks like:
The dots represent all the possible worlds in W ; the dashed rectangles represent the different ∼-equivalence classes, linearly
ordered from left to right, with the lowest, i.e., the set [K ], appearing ﬁrst on the left. Thus, for any two worlds w , w ′
appearing in the same rectangle we have w ∼ w ′ , while if w appears in a rectangle strictly to the left of w ′ then w < w ′ .
This is enough to depict . The second ordering  is depicted by the arrows. An arrow from w ′ to w denotes w  w ′ .3 For
convenience we omit all reﬂexive arrows. We emphasise here that  is not assumed to be transitive in general. The one real
restriction is that it is not allowed to have an arrow crossing a dashed boundary from left to right. This is because ⊆.
Given a belief set K and a K -context (,), we use (,) to deﬁne a removal operator (,) for K by setting, for all
φ ∈ L∗ ,
K (,) φ = Th
({
w
∣∣ w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈min([¬φ],)}).
That is, the models of the belief set resulting from a removal of φ are obtained by locating all the -best models of ¬φ,
and adding to those all worlds that are at least as -plausible.
Deﬁnition 3.  is a basic removal operator (for K ) iff  is equal to (,) for some K -context (,).
2.1. Examples
Suppose our language L contains precisely three propositional variables p, q and r. We will denote each possible world
by a triple xyz of 0s or 1s, where x, y and z denote the truth-value according to that world of p, q and r respectively. So,
for example, 010 denotes that world in which both p and r are false and q is true. Now suppose K = Cn(q ∧ (r → p)) (so
[K ] = {111,110,010}) and let the following picture represent a particular K -context (,).
2 But see the work by Booth et al. [15] where the assumption that  is a total pre-order is relaxed.
3 Observe that arrows therefore point in the direction of the worlds lower down in the ordering.
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which can be found in the second lowest -rank. Then we add all worlds which are below these according to . Doing this
leads us to the set of worlds covered by the grey area in the picture below:
Thus we end up with the set {111,010,101,000}, i.e., K (,)q = Cn(p ↔ r). Observe that the new model set after removal
here is not a superset of the initial model set [K ]. As a consequence K (,) q ⊆ K . Removal of q has led in this example
to the acquisition of new beliefs (for instance p → r). This shows that the widely-accepted (Inclusion) rule (K φ ⊆ K ) fails
to hold in general for basic removal.
Another property for removal operators which fails is the (Vacuity) rule (if φ /∈ K then K  φ = K ), which says that if
the sentence to be removed does not belong to the initial belief set, then its removal should leave the belief set unchanged.
For suppose in the above example we want to remove ¬r rather than q. Note that ¬r /∈ K . This time the unique -minimal
model of ¬¬r is 111, appearing in the lowest level, i.e., [K ]. The only world (other than itself) which is less than or equal
according to  is 110:
Thus we obtain K (,) ¬r = Th({111,110}) = Cn(p ∧ q), and we see that removal of a non-believed sentence has led to
changes in the belief set, for instance the acquisition of the belief in p.
We will shortly see which properties are valid for basic removal, but before that we present the following result, which
says that every basic removal is generated by a unique K -context. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
K -contexts and the basic removal operators for K .
Proposition 4. Let (,) and (′,′) be two K -contexts which are not identical. That is, (,) = (′,′). Then (,) =
(′,′) .
Before moving on to the promised characterisation of basic removal, we demonstrate how formal K -contexts can be used
to represent a particular context underlying the beliefs of an agent.
2.2. Providing context
In this section we elaborate on the use of K -contexts as a way of representing the context in which an agent performs
belief change by considering a simple example. In particular, we show that K -contexts can be used to represent contextual
information which may be blocked by the current beliefs of an agent, but that a belief removal may trigger the unblocking
of this information, depending on the appropriate context.
Consider the well-known case of representing information about Tweety. We are interested in using a K -context to
capture, not only information about what an agent currently believes about Tweety, but also the contextual information
about birds. More speciﬁcally, we require that the K -context should contain the information that an ostrich is a bird, as
well as the default information that birds normally ﬂy, but that ostriches normally don’t ﬂy. The information about ostriches
being birds is more entrenched than the default information about birds being able to ﬂy and ostriches not being able to
ﬂy. Moreover, given the principle of speciﬁcity, we take the default information about ostriches not being able to ﬂy to be of
a higher precedence than the default information of birds being able to ﬂy.
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bird) which cannot ﬂy, or that Tweety is a bird (but not an ostrich) which can ﬂy.
We represent the beliefs of the agent in a language L containing precisely three propositional variables b (Tweety is a
bird), o (Tweety is an ostrich) and f (Tweety can ﬂy). As above, we will denote each possible world by a triple xyz of 0s
or 1s, where x, y and z denote the truth-value according to that world of b, o and f respectively. In this case we have
K = Cn(b ∧ ¬(o ↔ f )) (so [K ] = {110,101}) and we let the following picture represent our chosen K -context (,).
The intuition for the choice of (,) can be explained as follows. The worst -worlds are those in which the information
that an ostrich is a bird is violated: the worlds 011 and 010 in which Tweety is an ostrich but not a bird. This is followed
by the single world 111 which violates the default information about ostriches not being able to ﬂy. Next is the single world
100 which violates the default information about birds being able to ﬂy. After this we get the two worlds 001 and 000, both
of which are compatible with all the contextual information, but are not models of the agent’s current beliefs. So in these
worlds Tweety is neither a bird nor an ostrich and the contextual information therefore has nothing to say about its ﬂying
abilities (or lack thereof). The best -worlds are, of course, the models of K : the worlds 110 and 101.
The second ordering  is now used to capture a context relating to the manner in which the default assertions apply, as
well as how they interact. It indicates explicitly that a world in which Tweety is a ﬂying bird, but not an ostrich, is preferred
over the world in which Tweety is a ﬂying bird and also an ostrich, an indication that the default assertion indicating that
ostriches don’t ﬂy is to be preferred over the default assertion that birds ﬂy.
Suppose now that we want to remove the sentence that Tweety is an ostrich from the agent’s beliefs. Observe that the
agent currently does not believe that Tweety is an ostrich. Formally, we want to remove the sentence o from K . To do so,
we ﬁrst obtain the -minimal models of ¬o. This is the world 101, found in the lowest -rank (and one of the models
of K ). Then we add all worlds which are below these according to . In this case, nothing is added, and we end up with
the set {101}, i.e., K (,) o = Cn(b ∧ ¬o ∧ f ). Or more informally, the agent now believes that Tweety is a bird, but not
an ostrich, which can ﬂy. So, the explicit removal of the information that Tweety is an ostrich acts as a mechanism for
unblocking the default information that birds normally ﬂy, and we end up with a belief set in which Tweety the bird is
assumed not to be an ostrich, and is able to ﬂy.
Also, it is easily checked that similar results are obtained if the negation of o (the information that Tweety is not an
ostrich) is removed from K . In this case the default information about ostriches normally ﬂying is unblocked, and our agent
ends up believing that Tweety is an ostrich (and a bird) which is assumed not to ﬂy.
Finally, suppose that we want to remove from the agent’s beliefs the (default) assertion that Tweety being an ostrich
implies that it cannot ﬂy, an explicit assertion not currently in the agent’s belief set. Formally we want to remove the
sentence o → ¬ f from K . To do so we ﬁrst obtain the -minimal models of ¬(o → ¬ f ), in this case just the single world
111. Then we add to it all worlds which are below 111 according to  (in this case the world 101) and we end up with
the set {111,101}. From this it follows that K (,) (o → ¬ f ) = Cn(b ∧ f ), and the agent thus ends up believing that
Tweety is a ﬂying bird. So the explicit removal of the more speciﬁc default assertion (Tweety being an ostrich implying that
it cannot ﬂy) frees up the remaining default assertion (Tweety being a bird implying that it can ﬂy) to ﬁre, and we end up
with a belief set in which Tweety the bird is assumed to be able to ﬂy.
To conclude this subsection, observe that belief removal in these examples satisﬁes neither (Inclusion) nor (Vacuity).
2.3. Characterising basic removal
Basic removal is characterised by the following postulates, in addition to the fundamental rules (B1)–(B4)4:
(B5) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)
(B6) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then K  φ ⊆ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(B7) (K  θ) ∩ (K  φ) ⊆ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(B8) If φ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then K  (θ ∧ φ) ⊆ K  φ
4 The list given in [1] contained one extra rule, viz. ‘K  φ ⊆ K + ¬φ ’. It turns out this rule is derivable from the others (mainly (B5)). See rule (X1) in
Lemma B in Appendix A.
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traction postulates [9], while (B5) and (B6) both follow from the AGM postulates (see [9,16,17]). The latter rule is closely
related to the well-known rule Cut from non-monotonic inference [18], while the former is sometimes known in the litera-
ture as Conjunctive Trisection. A slight reformulation may be found already in [9] under the name Partial Antitony. Another
reformulation of it is the following:
Proposition 5. Let  be any removal operator. Then  satisﬁes (B5) iff it satisﬁes:
(B5′) K  θ ⊆ (K  (θ ∧ φ)) + ¬θ
The remaining two basic AGM contraction rules, which are both missing from the list (B1)–(B8), are (Inclusion) (see
previous subsections) and (Recovery):
(Recovery) K ⊆ (K  φ) + φ
(Inclusion) has been questioned before by Bochman [19] and Booth et al. [10], the latter leading to the study of belief
liberation operators. (Recovery) has been questioned in many places in the literature (e.g. [16,3]). Brieﬂy, liberation operators
cater to the intuition that removing a belief from an agent’s corpus can remove the reasons for not holding others and hence
lead to the inclusion of new beliefs.
Theorem 6. Let K be a belief set and  an operator for K . Then  is a basic removal operator for K iff  satisﬁes (B1)–(B8).
Given Theorem 6, we see that basic removals seem closely related to the similarly general approach to removal presented
by Bochman [19, Ch. 12]. Like basic removal, Bochman’s operators in their most general form fail to validate (Vacuity),
(Inclusion) and (Recovery), while they do satisfy (B5)–(B7).
The completeness part of Theorem 6 is proved by using the following construction of a pair of orderings from a given
belief set and basic removal operator.
Deﬁnition 7. The structure (,) obtained from a belief set K and a basic removal operator , and denoted by C(K ,) is
deﬁned as follows, for w1,w2 ∈ W :
() w1  w2 iff ¬α1 /∈ K  (¬α1 ∧ ¬α2)
() w1  w2 iff ¬α1 /∈ K  ¬α2
where αi is a sentence whose only model is wi (for i = 1,2).
In the theorem the structure C(K ,) is used by checking that if  satisﬁes the postulates (B1)–(B8), then (,) is
a K -context and that  = (,) . We employ this construction throughout the paper to prove that certain postulates are
complete for certain sub-classes of basic removal. (See the appendices for full proofs.)
We now investigate how different requirements on the second ordering of plausibility  and its interplay with  help
us characterise different belief removal operations.
3. Transitive removal
The ﬁrst two constraints on  may be viewed as necessary extra requirements on K -contexts. This is because they both
lead to plausible properties of removal operators which, as we shall see later, are common to virtually all the proposed
removal operators from the literature.
3.1. Transitivity
First we investigate the effect of setting the second order  to be transitive, i.e.,  becomes a pre-order. We refer to the
K -context (,) as transitive if  is transitive.
Deﬁnition 8. We call  a transitive removal operator (for K ) iff  is equal to (,) for some transitive K -context (,).
Transitive removal operators may be alternatively described as follows. As with any pre-order, the relation  partitions
W into a set W/ of equivalence classes via the relation  deﬁned by w1  w2 iff both w1  w2 and w2  w1. The
set W/ is partially-ordered by the relation ∗ deﬁned by [w1] ∗ [w2] iff w1  w2. Meanwhile, we can also deﬁne
a relation ∗ on W/ by [w1] ∗ [w2] iff w1  w2. It is easy to check that ∗ is well-deﬁned and that ∗ is a total
pre-order on W/ such that ∗ ⊆∗ .
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Here, the grey ellipses now represent the -equivalence classes from the previous paragraph. An arrow leading from one
ellipse to another means that for all worlds w in the second class and all worlds w ′ in the ﬁrst class we have w  w ′ and
w ′  w . The full relation  is obtained by taking the transitive closure of the arrows.
Furthermore we have, for each φ ∈ L∗ , K (,) φ = Th(⋃Υ ), where
Υ = {X ∈ W/ ∣∣ X ∗ Y for some Y ∈min(¬φ,∗)},
and where min(¬φ,∗) denotes the set of ∗-minimal elements Y ∈ W/ such that Y ∩ [¬φ] = ∅. Note how worlds
belonging to the same equivalence class are ‘indistinguishable’ to the agent using the K -context (,).
For example, suppose the -minimal models of ¬φ are the white dots. The new model set is then just the union of the
dark grey ellipses.
The next result shows how we can axiomatically characterise the class of transitive removal operators.
Proposition 9.
(i) If (,) is transitive then (,) satisﬁes5:
(BTran) If K  θ ⊆ (K  φ) + ¬φ then K  θ ⊆ K  φ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BTran) then the relation  of C(K ,) is transitive.
The reader familiar with the belief change literature will immediately recognise the right-hand side of the antecedent of
this rule as the Levi Identity [2], which is commonly employed to deﬁne operators of revision in terms of removal operators.
The goal of a revision operation K × φ is to produce a new belief which must contain the given sentence φ. Given any
removal operator , let us denote by × = R() the operator deﬁned from  via the Levi Identity, viz.
K × φ = (K  ¬φ) + φ.
Thus (BTran) may be thought of as saying that if the act of revising by ¬φ produces a larger belief set than the act of
removing θ , then so too will the act of merely removing φ.
5 (BTran) replaces the more complicated and rather unintuitive postulate which was used to characterise transitivity in [1], viz.:
(BT) If K  θ  K  φ then there exist ψ,λ ∈ L∗ such that φ  ψ  λ and (K  θ) ∪ (K  λ)  φ.
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Proposition 10. Any removal operator which satisﬁes (BTran) and (B5′) also satisﬁes (B6).
So transitive removal operators may be characterised by (B1)–(B5), (B7), (B8) and (BTran).
3.2. Priority
Now consider the following property of a K -context (,):
(a) If w1 ∼ w2 and w1  w2 then w2  w1
Given the fact ⊆, this is easily seen to be equivalent to:
(a′) If w1 ≺ w2 then w1 < w2
Thus if w1  w2 but not vice versa, then w1 is strictly more plausible than w2.
Proposition 11.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (a) then (,) satisﬁes:
(BPriority) If θ ∈ K  φ and φ /∈ K  θ then θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BPriority) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (a).
The property (BPriority) is brieﬂy mentioned under the name ‘Priority’ in [19], and is also brieﬂy mentioned right at the
end of [20]. It can be read as saying that if φ is excluded following removal of θ , but not vice versa, then θ is strictly more
entrenched than φ, in the sense that when directed to exclude θ ∧φ (and thus to exclude at least one of θ,φ), θ is included
and φ excluded.
As we indicated at the start of this section, the family of removal operators generated by transitive K -contexts satisfying
(a) remains general enough to include virtually all of the families described in the rest of this paper. Thus the list of
rules comprising (B1)–(B5), (B7), (B8), (BTran) and (BPriority) can be considered a ‘common core’ of postulates for belief
removal. In terms of the alternative description of transitive removal given above in terms of equivalence classes, requiring
(a) of (,) in addition to transitivity has the effect that the relations ∗ and ∗ on W/ satisfy, for all X, Y ∈ W/:
X ∗ Y implies X <∗ Y or X = Y , where <∗ is the strict part of ∗ . Thus any two distinct classes X, Y which are on the
same ‘level’ according to ∗ (in that both X ∗ Y and Y ∗ X ) are incomparable according to ∗ .
The picture for transitive K -contexts satisfying (a) is the same as that for transitive removals, except it is now disallowed to
have an arrow between any two ellipses lying within the same dashed rectangle.
The next result shows how, for basic removal, the two rules (BTran) and (BPriority) may be repackaged into an equiva-
lent single rule.
Proposition 12.
(i) If (,) is both transitive and satisﬁes (a) then (,) satisﬁes:
(BConserv) If K  θ ⊆ K  φ then there exists λ ∈ L∗ such that φ  λ and (K  θ) ∪ (K  λ)  φ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BConserv) then C(K ,) is transitive and satisﬁes (a).
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[21,3] and used to characterise operations of so-called base-generated contraction.
3.3. Strong conservativity
By going a step further and identifying λ with φ in (BConserv) we arrive at a yet stronger postulate:
(BSConserv) If K  θ ⊆ K  φ then (K  θ) ∪ (K  φ)  φ
(BSConserv) is known as Strong Conservativity [21], and is used by [10] to help characterise the so-called σ -liberation
operators (see Section 5). Booth et al. [22] also provide a detailed justiﬁcation for the use of this rule. For basic removal, we
can capture this property by requiring the following property, in conjunction with transitivity:
(b) If w1 ∼ w2 then w1  w2
Proposition 13.
(i) If (,) is transitive and satisﬁes (b) then (,) satisﬁes (BSConserv).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BSConserv) then C(K ,) is transitive and satisﬁes (b).
Condition (b) implies (a). In terms of the above construction in terms of W/, requiring  to be transitive while
strengthening (a) to (b) has the effect that the relation ∗ becomes a total order on W/.
In terms of the picture above, this means we are now restricted to just one ellipse per dashed rectangle. Note that this
family will crop up later, turning out to be the family of σ -liberation operators.
4. Towards AGM contraction
It was noted in Section 2 that basic removal does not satisfy the three basic AGM contraction postulates (Vacuity),
(Inclusion) and (Recovery). In Section 7 it is shown that the severe withdrawal operators, which are known not to satisfy
(Recovery) [12], are all basic removal operators, thus proving that (Recovery) fails for basic removal. ‘One half ’ of (Vacuity),
however, is valid for basic removal:
Proposition 14. Let  be a basic removal operator for K , then  satisﬁes: If φ /∈ K then K ⊆ K  φ .
The ‘missing half ’ of (Vacuity) is: If φ /∈ K then K φ ⊆ K . Clearly this rule doubles as a weakened version of (Inclusion).
Thus we see that, for basic removal operators, (Inclusion) actually implies (Vacuity). In the rest of this paper we will adopt
the following notational conventions for describing removal operators:
• The symbol  will be used to refer to members of the general family of basic removal operators, when nothing is
assumed about whether the operator satisﬁes (Vacuity) or (Inclusion).
• The symbol ÷ will be used if the removal operator is intended or known to satisfy (Vacuity), but not necessarily
(Inclusion).
• Symbol −˙ will be used if the operator is intended or known to satisfy (Inclusion) as well as (Vacuity).
Now let us verify under what conditions on (,) each of these postulates are satisﬁed by basic removal operators.
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To ensure that (,) satisfy all of (Vacuity), we require that all -minimal elements (i.e., all elements of [K ]) are
-connected, i.e.:
(c) If w1,w2 ∈min(W,) then w1  w2
In terms of the picture for transitive removal, this corresponds to the requirement that there is only one ellipse in the
leftmost dashed rectangle, which represents the minimal -rank.
Proposition 15.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (c) then (,) satisﬁes (Vacuity).
(ii) If  is a removal operators satisfying (Vacuity) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (c).
As is easily veriﬁed, (c) is implied by condition (b). Thus we see that any basic removal satisfying (BSConserv) satisﬁes
(Vacuity). However, since (c) is not implied by (a), (Vacuity) is not valid for transitive removals satisfying (a).
Shouldn’t (Vacuity) be a basic requirement for any rational removal operation? From a purely minimal change point of
view it is certainly hard to contest, but we would nevertheless argue there are scenarios in which it can fail. Consider an
agent with equally good reasons to believe each of p and ¬p. In this situation the agent remains cautious and commits
to believe neither p nor ¬p. But if this agent were then to receive information that undermines p then it would come to
believe (or assign signiﬁcantly more plausibility to) ¬p.
One could always try and force a given basic removal  to satisfy (Vacuity) by deﬁning a new operator ÷′ from  by
K ÷′ φ =
{
K if φ /∈ K ,
K  φ otherwise.
It is straightforward to show that so deﬁned ÷′ satisﬁes (B1)–(B8), and so again forms a basic removal.
Proposition 16. If (,) is the K -context corresponding to , then the K -context corresponding to ÷′ deﬁned above is (,′),
where′ is obtained from  by setting w1 ′ w2 iff w1  w2 or w1,w2 ∈ [K ].
However we run into diﬃculties in the case of transitive removal, for it turns out that rule (BTran) is not preserved.
This is because if  is transitive then ′ need not be. Indeed it is quite possible to have three models w1,w2,w3 such
that w1,w2 ∈ [K ], w3 /∈ [K ], w1  w3 and w2  w3. Then w1 ′ w2 ′ w3 but w1 ′ w3. How can we modify a transitive
removal operator so that it satisﬁes (Vacuity)? The answer is to just take the transitive closure of ′ above. It is easy to see
this is the same thing as setting w1 ′′ w2 iff either w1  w2 or [w1 ∈ [K ] and w ′  w2 for some w ′ ∈ [K ]]. In terms of the
picture, all we do is coalesce all the ellipses in the leftmost dashed rectangle into one, and leave all the arrows as is, so that
any arrow which was previously going into any ellipse in this rectangle is just pointing now instead at the unique single
ellipse there. (Following this step we may remove any redundant arrows.) If  is the basic removal operator generated by
(,), then we will denote by V() the removal operator generated by (,′′) as deﬁned above.
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satisﬁes (a), then so will (,′′) (because ′′ does not introduce any arrows between worlds on the same level). Hence if
 is transitive (satisﬁes (BTran)) and satisﬁes (BPriority) then so does V().
The next result shows how we can express V() so constructed directly in terms of .
Proposition 17. Let  be a removal operator for K corresponding to K -context (,) and let ÷ = V(). Then
K ÷ φ =
{
K ∩ K  φ if K ∪ K  φ is consistent,
K  φ otherwise.
4.2. Inclusion
To obtain (Inclusion) we may add the following condition, stronger than (c):
(d) If w1 ∈min(W,) then w1  w2 for all w2
So the -minimum worlds are also the -minimum worlds. In the picture for transitive removals, this means there is only
one ellipse in the leftmost dashed rectangle, and furthermore there is a path along the arrows to this ellipse from every
other ellipse in the picture.
Proposition 18.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (d) then (,) satisﬁes (Inclusion).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Inclusion) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (d).
Even though basic removal operators do not satisfy (Inclusion) in general, it is always possible to transform a given basic
removal  into an operator which does satisfy that rule. We simply take the incarceration −˙ of  [10], i.e., the operator
deﬁned from  by using the following slight variant of the Harper Identity [2]:
K −˙ φ = K ∩ (K  φ).
We shall denote the incarceration of  by I(). It can be shown the incarceration of a basic removal operator is always
itself a basic removal:
Proposition 19. If (,) is the K -context corresponding to , then the K -context corresponding to I() is (,′′), where ′′ is
obtained from  by setting w1 ′′ w2 iff w1  w2 or w1 ∈ [K ]. Furthermore:
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(ii) If  satisﬁes (a) then so does ′′ .
(iii) If  satisﬁes (b) then so does ′′ .
Part (i) of the above proposition says that the incarceration of any transitive removal operator is again transitive, while
parts (ii) and (iii) imply that the rules (BPriority), (BConserv) and (BSConserv) are each preserved under taking incarcera-
tions.
4.3. Recovery
To obtain (Recovery) it suﬃces to require the following condition:
(e) If w1  w2 then w1 = w2 or w1 ∈min(W,)
So, apart from itself, nothing but -minimal worlds may be below any world in . This means that when removal of φ
takes place, the new model set will consist of the -minimal ¬φ-worlds (the white dots in the picture below), together
with some subset of the -minimal worlds. Note that this subset may be a strict subset of min(W,).
Proposition 20.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (e) then (,) satisﬁes (Recovery).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Recovery) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (e).
The combination of (d) and (e) then states that the worlds below a world w in  are exactly w itself and the -minimal
worlds. Thus in this case −˙(,) is completely determined by  alone via:
[
K −˙(,) φ
]= [K ] ∪min([¬φ],),
which is precisely the AGM contraction operator generated by  [4,5,9].
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(i) −˙ is a full AGM contraction operator (i.e., satisfying the basic and supplementary AGM postulates).
(ii) −˙ satisﬁes (B1)–(B8) plus (Inclusion) and (Recovery).
(iii) −˙ = −˙(,) for some (,) which satisﬁes (d) and (e).
Observe that since (d)+(e) implies transitivity and (a), every full AGM contraction satisﬁes (BTran), (BPriority) and
(BConserv).
5. Belief liberation
Booth et al. [10] present two models of belief liberation operators, each in terms of ﬁnite sequences of sentences. The
second model, linear liberation, is more general than the ﬁrst, σ -liberation as the class of liberation operators it generates
includes those generated by the ﬁrst. The ﬁrst construction employs a linearly ordered sequence of sentences and the second
a set of candidate belief sets one of which corresponds to the agent’s set after belief retraction. They also provide axiomatic
characterisations of each of these classes.
5.1. Linear liberation
A K -sequence is any sequence of sentences ρ = (β1, . . . , βm) such that K = Cn(β1). For any K -sequence ρ we can deﬁne
a removal operator ÷ρ by setting6
K ÷ρ φ =
{
Cn(βi) where i =min{k | βk  φ} if ∨k βk  φ,
Cn(∅) otherwise.
Then an operator ÷ for K is a linear liberation operator (for K ) iff ÷ = ÷ρ for some K -sequence ρ .
Linear liberation is characterised by (B1)–(B3) plus (Vacuity) and the following rule7:
(Hyperreg) If θ /∈ K ÷ (θ ∧ φ) then K ÷ (θ ∧ φ) = K ÷ θ
This is the rule termed Hyperregularity in [21]. The ﬁrst thing to note about (Hyperreg) is that, in the presence of (B1)–(B4),
it actually implies (Vacuity) and the remaining rules for basic removal (B5)–(B8). Thus we see:
Proposition 22. ÷ is a linear liberation operator iff it is a basic removal operator which satisﬁes (Hyperreg).
Is there a condition on (,) which corresponds exactly to (Hyperreg)? It turns out the following condition does the
trick:
(f) If w1 ∼ w2 and w3  w1 then w3  w2
Rule (f) says that whether or not a world w3 is below w1 according to  depends only on the -plausibility rank of w1.
In terms of the picture, a major effect of this is that the new model set when removing φ will always contain all worlds
which are in the same -rank as the -minimal ¬φ-worlds. Furthermore the set of models below this rank which are to
be included in the new model set is determined entirely by this rank. Thus the number of possible distinct belief sets which
may result from an operation of removal is exactly the number of plausibility ranks.
6 Booth et al. [10] also allowed the removal of tautologies, a difference that may safely be ignored.
7 Taking into account that here, unlike in [10], we don’t allow the removal of a tautology.
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(i) If (,) satisﬁes (f) then ÷(,) satisﬁes (Hyperreg).
(ii) If ÷ is a removal operator satisfying (Hyperreg) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (f).
Thus we see linear liberation operators may be represented by the class of K -contexts which satisfy (f).
Note that (f) doesn’t imply transitivity, but does imply (b) (and therefore (a)). In the presence of (B1) and (B2), (Hyper-
reg) implies the following rule known as Decomposition:
K  (θ ∧ φ) = K  θ or K  (θ ∧ φ) = K  φ
As is noted in [2, p. 66], this condition is not desirable in general. For this reason (f) might be too strong to be a general
requirement.
5.2. σ -Liberation
The deﬁnition of σ -liberation is, like linear liberation, based on sequences σ = (α1, . . . ,αn) of sentences, although the
sequences are used in a different way. One natural way to interpret the sequence is as the list of previous revision inputs
the agent has received, with α1 being the ﬁrst and αn the most recent. The construction begins by inductively deﬁning, for
each φ ∈ L, an increasing sequence of sets of sentences Γi(σ ,φ) by setting Γ0(σ ,φ) = ∅ and then, for each i = 0, . . . ,n− 1,
Γi+1(σ ,φ) =
{
Γi ∪ {αn−i} if Γi ∪ {αn−i}  φ,
Γi otherwise.
That is, starting at the end with αn , we work our way backwards through the sequence, adding each sentence as we go,
provided adding it to the sentences collected up to that point does not lead to the inference of φ. If Cn(Γn(σ ,⊥)) = K then
we say σ is a belief sequence relative to K . Then every belief sequence relative to K deﬁnes a removal operator ÷σ by
setting
K ÷σ φ = Cn
(
Γn(σ ,φ)
)
.
Finally, an operator ÷ for K is a σ -liberation operator (for K ) iff ÷ = ÷σ for some belief sequence σ relative to K .
Booth et al. [10] show that the σ -liberation operators are precisely those linear liberation operators which satisfy
(BSConserv). Using this fact together with Propositions 13 and 23 allows us to deduce:
Proposition 24. ÷ is a σ -liberation operator iff ÷ is equal to ÷(,) for some transitive (,) satisfying (b) and (f).
However we can simplify here, for as soon as  is transitive, conditions (b) and (f) become equivalent:
Proposition 25. Let (,) be a transitive K -context. Then (,) satisﬁes (b) iff (,) satisﬁes (f).
This means that in Proposition 24 it is unnecessary to require both (b) and (f)—just one of them will suﬃce. Depending
on which one we choose to retain, we obtain two different characterisations of σ -liberation which provide alternatives to
the one from [10]:
Proposition 26. The following are equivalent:
(i) ÷ is a σ -liberation operator.
(ii) ÷ is a linear liberation operator which satisﬁes (BTran).
(iii) ÷ is a basic removal operator which satisﬁes (BSConserv).
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(i) ⇔ (iii) comes from combining Proposition 24 (retaining just (b)) with Proposition 13. Surprisingly, (i) ⇔ (ii) says that, in
the axiomatisation of σ -liberation in [10], (BSConserv) may be replaced by the seemingly much weaker (BTran). Meanwhile,
since (i) ⇔ (iii), σ -liberation operators inherit the nice description in terms of W/ given for the basic removals which
satisfy (BSConserv) at the end of Section 3 (where ∗ is a total order on W/).
Similar characterisations for sub-classes of liberation, such as the class of dichotomous liberation operators [10], exist. We
consider these next.
In [10] the sub-class of σ -liberation operators known as the dichotomous liberation operators are characterised by adding
the following postulate:
(Dichotomy) (K  θ) ∪ (K  φ)  ⊥ implies K  θ = K  φ
The following condition on (,) corresponds to (Dichotomy):
(e′) w1  w2 iff w1 ∼ w2
This condition requires that the worlds below a world w in  are precisely those with the same plausibility ranking as w .
Proposition 27.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (e′) then (,) satisﬁes (Dichotomy).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Dichotomy) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (e′).
It turns out that adding (Dichotomy) to the postulates for basic removal gives exactly dichotomous liberation.
Proposition 28. The following are equivalent:
(i)  is a dichotomous liberation operator.
(ii)  satisﬁes (B1)–(B8) plus (Dichotomy).
(iii)  = (,) for some (,) which satisﬁes (e′).
The equivalence (i) ⇔ (iii) comes from combining Propositions 24 and 27, while (ii) ⇔ (iii) comes from combining
Theorem 6 and Proposition 27.
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An interesting sub-class of basic removal operators, which includes both systematic [11] and severe withdrawal [12] (see
below) is obtained by requiring the following condition on (,):
(g) If w1 < w2 then w1  w2
where < is the strict part of . When removing φ, the effect is that the new model set will contain, along with the -
minimal ¬φ-worlds, all worlds considered strictly more -plausible, together with possibly some of the φ-worlds appearing
in the same -plausibility rank as these -minimal ¬φ-worlds.
Proposition 29.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (g) then (,) satisﬁes:
(B9) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then φ ∈ K  θ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B9) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (g).
The class of basic removal operators (,) such that (,) satisﬁes (g) still do not generally satisfy (Inclusion) or
(Vacuity), since condition (g) does not rule out that some -minimal elements may be -unconnected. However they do
come very close to satisfying (Inclusion), in that the following is satisﬁed:
If θ ∈ K then K  θ ⊆ K
Using this fact, we see that for this class of operators, (Inclusion) and (Vacuity) are equivalent.
The next condition on K -contexts is, essentially, a requirement for antisymmetry to hold:
(h) If w1  w2 then either w1 < w2 or w1 = w2
So now, the φ-worlds appearing in the new model set after removing φ are selected exclusively among those considered
strictly more plausible than the -minimal ¬φ-worlds.
Proposition 30.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (h) then (,) satisﬁes:
(B10) If  (θ ∨ φ) and θ /∈ K  φ then φ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B10) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (h).
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(g)+(h) w1  w2 iff either w1 < w2 or w1 = w2
Note that  so deﬁned will automatically be transitive and will satisfy the condition (a) from Section 3.
Putting together Propositions 29 and 30, we have that the class of basic removal operators (,) where  is deﬁned
via (g)+(h) may be axiomatically characterised by (B1)–(B10). This looks very much like the class of systematic withdrawals.
A systematic withdrawal operator −˙ can be deﬁned in terms of  as follows [11]:
K −˙ φ = K ∩ Th(∇(min([¬φ],)))
where ∇(X) = {v | ∃w ∈ X s.t. v = w or v < w}. Unlike systematic withdrawal, the class of removal operators deﬁned by
(B1)–(B10) fails to satisfy (Inclusion)/(Vacuity), since all the -minimal elements are necessarily unconnected according to
. So in fact (Vacuity) will fail as soon as there is more than one -minimal element. These operators satisfy instead:
If φ /∈ K then ¬φ ∈ K  φ
That is, for these operators, we see K  φ is an operation which ‘demotes’ the status of φ: if its current status is ‘accepted’,
i.e., φ ∈ K , then its status is ‘demoted’ to ‘undecided’ i.e., φ,¬φ /∈ K φ, while if its current status is ‘undecided’ then its sta-
tus is ‘demoted’ to ‘rejected’. If its status is already ‘rejected’ then no change occurs. However, if we take the incarcerations
of these operators then we end up with precisely the class of systematic withdrawal operators.
Systematic withdrawal can also be obtained by weakening (h):
(j) If w1  w2 then w1 < w2, w1 = w2, or w1  w ′ ∀w ′
So, unlike (h), (j) allows the models of K to be connected according to , although it does not force them to be.
Proposition 31.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (j) then (,) satisﬁes:
(B11) If  (θ ∨ φ) and θ ∈ K \ K  φ then φ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B11) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (j).
Since the operators obtained from (g) and (h) form a sub-class of the operators obtained from (g) and (j), the latter class
still does not satisfy (Vacuity). But adding (c) (and therefore (Vacuity)) to (g) and (j) leads exactly to systematic withdrawal.
Proposition 32. The following are equivalent:
(i) −˙ is a systematic withdrawal.
(ii) −˙ satisﬁes (B1)–(B8) plus (Vacuity), (B9) and (B11).
(iii) −˙ = (,) for some (,) which satisﬁes (c), (g) and (j).
As we shall see in the next section, the class of severe withdrawals can be isolated in a similar manner.
7. Limiting cases
We have seen that the addition of the second ordering  provides us with considerable ﬂexibility when deﬁning removal
operators. But what happens when we focus on the limits imposed on ? In this section we consider the two cases where
 is the smallest and the largest reﬂexive sub-relation of .
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If we take  to be the smallest , the equality relation, then the operator (,) reduces to K (,) φ =
Th(min([¬φ],)),
We have the following result.
Proposition 33.
(i) If  is the equality relation then (,) satisﬁes:
(B12) ¬φ ∈ K  φ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B12) then  in C(K ,) is the equality relation.
Thus we see that removing φ here amounts to a revision by its negation, and in fact that (,) essentially reduces to
an AGM revision function (satisfying the full list of AGM revision postulates [9]). More precisely the operator ∗(,) for K
deﬁned by K ∗(,) φ = K (,) ¬φ is an AGM revision operator. Moreover, every AGM revision operator can be obtained
in this way. Note that in the above case, since φ ∈ K (,) ¬φ, the right-hand side here is equal to (K (,) ¬φ) + φ.
Thus what we have is just the Levi Identity [2]. In fact a result more general holds. Recall that for any removal operator ,
we use R() to denote the operator derived from  via the Levi Identity:
Proposition 34. If  is a basic removal operator then R() is an AGM revision operator.
7.2. Severe withdrawal
By taking  to be the largest reﬂexive sub-relation of  we get the full relation , and the operator (,) reduces to:
K −˙(,) φ = Th
({
w
∣∣ w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈min([¬φ],)}).
Thus, from the characterisation of severe withdrawal in terms of total pre-orders found in [12], we see that setting  equal
to  gives us the class of severe withdrawal operators. Note that  so deﬁned will be transitive and satisfy condition
(b) from Section 3 (and hence also (f)—see Proposition 25). From the results above it turns out we can give an axiomatic
characterisation of severe withdrawal different to the ones found in the literature (see [12]). To do this note the follow-
ing:
Proposition 35. Let (,) be a K -context. Then  is equal to  iff both (f) and (g) are satisﬁed.
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Proposition 36. −˙ is a severe withdrawal operator iff it satisﬁes (B1)–(B4), (Hyperreg) and (B9).
8. Related work
It has long been recognised that extra-logical information is needed for a suﬃciently general theory of belief change.
Indeed, the use of plausibility orderings  on their own to deﬁne belief contraction is testament to that realisation. Hansson
[3] was probably the ﬁrst to point out that, even when we are concerned with belief sets, and not belief bases, it is useful to
draw a distinction between basic and derived beliefs. His uniﬁcation of belief base contraction and belief set contraction [21]
provides a framework for doing so, but his construction methods use belief bases, are not based on plausibility orderings
on worlds, and are therefore quite different from what we propose here. It is, of course, possible to compare his approach
and ours on the abstract level of postulates, but doing so is not a trivial matter, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Cantwell [6] points out that some beliefs do not ﬁt neatly into Hansson’s categories of basic vs. derived beliefs. In
addition to an entrenchment ordering on sentences, he also proposes an eligibility relation on sentences. His entrenchment
orderings can be converted to our plausibility orderings  on worlds, and he employs the entrenchment orderings in such a
way that it corresponds to Rott and Pagnucco’s severe withdrawal [12]. His eligibility relation regards two sentences ψ and
φ as related iff ψ is eligible for removal whenever φ has to be removed. He then uses these eligibility relations to restrict
the sentences removed by a given severe withdrawal (obtained from a speciﬁc entrenchment ordering).
Cantwell’s work is thus similar in spirit to ours in the sense that he introduces, as part of the required extra-logical
information to perform belief change, a second ordering on top of the standard entrenchment ordering. In terms of con-
struction, it is quite different from our work, though. At present, there does not seem to be a link between his eligibility
ordering on sentences and our second ordering  on worlds. When comparing the operators generated by our K -contexts
with those generated by Cantwell’s eligible contraction, it is unclear what the intersection of these two classes of removal
operators looks like, except for the fact that severe withdrawal and AGM contraction are special cases of both classes. As
is the case with Hansson’s work, a detailed comparison between our work and that of Cantwell is possible on the abstract
level of postulates. But because the construction methods are so different, this is a non-trivial task, and is beyond the scope
of this paper.
A different approach to the provision of extra-logical information to characterise belief change is that of Bochman’s [19]
general theory of the contraction of epistemic states, which aims to unify classical belief base contraction and belief set
contraction. Bochman deﬁnes an epistemic state as an ordered collection of belief sets. The contraction of an epistemic state
by a sentence φ is deﬁned as the intersection of the minimal belief sets which do not entail φ. So Bochman’s method of
constructing contraction operators is quite different from our method for constructing belief removal operators based on
K -contexts. On the other hand, on an abstract level his approach is perhaps the closest to our notion of basic removal.
Speciﬁcally, Bochman’s general form of contraction satisﬁes (B1) and (B3)–(B7) and, as is the case for basic removal, does
not satisfy (Vacuity), (Inclusion) and (Recovery).
9. Conclusion
In this study we have presented a uniﬁed framework for belief removal in terms of a possible world semantics which
is distinctive in that it uses a pair of orderings over the set of possible worlds. We argued for the intuitive plausibility of
this pair and showed how a large class of belief removal operators such as liberation, systematic and severe withdrawal
operators could be characterised by using them to guide belief change. This approach makes possible the identiﬁcation of
hitherto unstudied sub-classes of basic removal operators, such as those obtained by requiring of  to be a total pre-order
and a partial order. An obvious generalisation to consider in future work is the extension to propositional languages with a
countably inﬁnite number of propositional variables. Gabbay and Schlechta [14] have addressed this case, but in relation to
the initial work [1] on which this paper is based.
Also, a detailed study of the connection between basic removal, base-generated contraction, and sequence-based retrac-
tion is of interest. Finally, as in any formalism for belief change, we need to consider iterated removal and how this affects
the adjustment of worlds in both  and , as well as the interplay between  and .
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 2
In the proofs contained in these appendices we will sometimes treat a propositional world w as a sentence and write,
e.g., ¬w , w1 ∨ w2, etc. Whenever a world w appears in the scope of a propositional connective like this, it should be
understood as standing for any sentence α such that [α] = {w}. Such a sentence always exists under our assumption that
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sentence β such that K = Cn(β), and another useful fact that will be repeatedly used is that for any two deductively closed
sets K1, K2 we have K1 ⊆ K2 iff [K2] ⊆ [K1].
Proposition 4. Let (,) and (′,′) be two K -contexts that are not identical. That is, (,) = (′,′). Then (,) = (′,′) .
Proof. For this proof we will denote (,) by just  and (′,′) by ′ .
Suppose ﬁrst of all that  =′ . Then, without loss, let w1, w2 ∈ W be such that w1  w2 but w2 <′ w1. Now consider
the result of removing sentence ¬(w1 ∨ w2) from K using each of  and ′ . We will show that ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬(w1 ∨ w2)
but ¬w1 ∈ K ′ ¬(w1 ∨ w2), thus proving  = ′ in this case. By deﬁnition we know[
K  ¬(w1 ∨ w2)
]= {w ∣∣ w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈min([(w1 ∨ w2)],)},
and similarly for ′ , replacing , by ′,′ . Since [(w1 ∨ w2)] = {w1,w2} and w1  w2 we know w1 ∈ min([(w1 ∨
w2)],) and so by reﬂexivity of  we know w1 ∈ [K ¬(w1∨w2)]. Thus ¬w1 /∈ K ¬(w1∨w2) as claimed. Meanwhile for
′ , if it were the case that w1 ∈ [K ¬(w1 ∨w2)] then we would have w1 ′ w ′ for some w ′ ∈min([(w1 ∨w2)],′). Since
w2 <′ w1, the only element in min([(w1 ∨ w2)],) is w2. Hence this would mean w1 ′ w2. Since ′ ⊆′ by deﬁnition
of K -context this would imply w1 ′ w2—contradiction. Hence w1 /∈ [K  ¬(w1 ∨ w2)], i.e., ¬w1 ∈ K ′ ¬(w1 ∨ w2) as
required.
Now suppose  =′ . Without loss now let w1,w2 be such that w1  w2 but w1 ′ w2. In this case we can show  and
′ yield different results when removing ¬w2. First note that since [w2] = {w2} then min([w2],) =min([w2],′) = {w2}.
Since w1  w2 and w1 ′ w2 we thus know w1  w ′ for some w ′ ∈min([w2],) and w1 ′ w ′ for all w ′ ∈min([w2],′).
These two in turn imply w1 ∈ [K ¬w2] and w1 /∈ [K ′ ¬w2], hence ¬w1 /∈ K ¬w2 while ¬w1 ∈ K ′ ¬w2, so we have
shown  = ′ . 
Now for many of our proofs the following property, showing how the -minimal elements of [¬φ] can be described
directly in terms of (,) , will be key:
Lemma A. Let (,) be a K -context. For any φ ∈ L∗ , min([¬φ],) = [K (,) φ] ∩ [¬φ].
Proof. For the left-to-right inclusion we obviously have min([¬φ],) ⊆ [¬φ], while min([¬φ],) ⊆ [K (,) φ] follows
from the reﬂexivity of .
For the converse inclusion suppose w ∈ [K (,) φ)] ∩ [¬φ]. Then from w ∈ [K (,) φ)] we know w  w ′ for some
w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],). Since ⊆ we have w  w ′ , and so since w ∈ [¬φ] and from the minimality of w ′ we must have
w ∈min([¬φ],) as required. 
Recall postulates (B1)–(B8):
(B1) K  φ = Cn(K  φ)
(B2) φ /∈ K  φ
(B3) If φ1 ≡ φ2 then K  φ1 = K  φ2
(B4) K  ⊥ = K
(B5) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)
(B6) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then K  φ ⊆ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(B7) (K  θ) ∩ (K  φ) ⊆ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(B8) If φ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then K  (θ ∧ φ) ⊆ K  φ
Note that when using the above postulates in proofs we will sometimes not explicitly mention more obvious uses of
some of the more fundamental postulates, e.g., by (B3) we know always K  (θ ∧ φ) = K  (φ ∧ θ).
Proposition 5. Let  be any removal operator. Then  satisﬁes (B5) iff it satisﬁes:
(B5′) K  θ ⊆ (K  (θ ∧ φ)) + ¬θ
Proof. To show (B5) implies (B5′), ﬁrst let (θ) be any sentence such that K  θ = Cn((θ)). Now, by (B1) we know
(¬θ → (θ)) ∈ K  θ . Since θ ≡ (¬θ → (θ)) ∧ θ this means K  θ = K  ((¬θ → (θ)) ∧ θ) by (B3) and so we obtain
(¬θ → (θ)) ∈ K  ((¬θ → (θ)) ∧ θ). Applying (B5) to this we may deduce (¬θ → (θ)) ∈ K  ((¬θ → (θ)) ∧ θ ∧ φ).
But (¬θ → (θ))∧ θ ∧φ ≡ φ ∧ θ . Hence by (B3) we get (¬θ → (θ)) ∈ K  (φ ∧ θ), equivalently K  θ ⊆ (K  (φ ∧ θ))+¬θ
as required.
To show (B5′) implies (B5), suppose θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ). Now, (B5′) (with a little help from (B3)) tells us K  (θ ∧ φ) ⊆
(K  (θ ∧φ ∧ψ))+¬(θ ∧φ). Hence using this with the assumption θ ∈ K  (θ ∧φ) yields θ ∈ (K  (φ ∧ θ ∧ψ))+¬(θ ∧φ).
By classical logic this is equivalent to the desired θ ∈ K  (φ ∧ θ ∧ ψ). 
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Theorem 6. Let K be a belief set and  an operator for K . Then  is a basic removal operator for K iff  satisﬁes (B1)–(B8).
First let’s prove the postulates are sound for basic removal.
Proof. [Soundness] We check each postulate in turn:
(B1) K (,) φ = Cn(K (,) φ). Obvious.
(B2) φ /∈ K (,) φ. Since min([¬φ],) ⊆ [K (,) φ)] by Lemma A, we know there is at least one world in [K (,)
φ)] satisfying ¬φ. This is enough to show φ /∈ K (,) φ.
(B3) If φ1 ≡ φ2 then K (,) φ1 = K (,) φ2. Obvious.
(B4) K (,) ⊥ = K . Firstly, since  is anchored on [K ] we know [K ] = min(W,) = min([¬⊥],). By Lemma A,
then, [K ] ⊆ [K (,) ⊥]. Meanwhile, for any w ∈ W , if w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈ [K ] then, since  is a sub-relation of , also
w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈ [K ] and so, since  is transitive, w  w ′′ for all w ′′ ∈ W , i.e., w ∈ [K ]. Hence [K (,) ⊥] ⊆ [K ]
and so we have equality. This means K (,) ⊥ = K as required.
(B5) If θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ) then θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ). Suppose θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Choose any w0 ∈ min([¬(θ ∧
φ)],). Then we ﬁrst claim w ∈ [θ] for all w  w0. This holds since if w  w0 and w /∈ [θ], i.e., w ∈ [¬θ], then also
w ∈ [¬(θ ∧ φ)] and so, using the minimality of w0, we must have w ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). But then since min([¬(θ ∧
φ)],) ⊆ [K (,) (θ ∧φ)] (by Lemma A) and θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧φ) we must have w ∈ [θ]—contradiction. Hence w ∈ [θ] as
claimed. Now suppose w ′ ∈ [K (,) (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)]. We must show w ′ ∈ [θ]. But w ′ ∈ [K (,) (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)] gives w ′  w
for some w ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)],) and so, since  is a sub-relation of , w ′  w for some w ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)],).
From w0 ∈ [¬(θ ∧ φ)] we know w0 ∈ [¬(θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)] and so, by the minimality of w , w  w0. Hence, since  is transitive,
w ′  w0. We conclude from the above claim that w ′ ∈ [θ] as required.
(B6) If θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ) then K (,) φ ⊆ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Suppose θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Then using this with
Lemma A gives us min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],) ⊆ [θ]. This means it must be the case that min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],) ⊆ min([¬φ],), since
if w ∈min([¬(θ ∧φ)],) then w ∈ [θ] so we must have w ∈ [¬φ], and, since w  w ′ for all w ′ ∈ [¬(θ ∧φ)], we necessarily
have w  w ′ for all w ′ ∈ [¬φ]. So, for any w ′ , if w ′  w ′′ for some w ′′ ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],) then we immediately get also
w ′  w ′′ for some w ′′ ∈ min([¬φ],). This is enough to prove [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)] ⊆ [K (,) φ], which gives the required
conclusion.
(B7) (K (,) θ) ∩ (K (,) φ) ⊆ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Since [(K (,) θ)∩ (K (,) φ)] = [K (,) θ] ∪ [K (,) φ],
it suﬃces to show [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)] ⊆ [K (,) θ] ∪ [K (,) φ]. But this follows from the fact that min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],)
⊆min([¬θ],) ∪min([¬φ],), which is easy to show.
(B8) If φ /∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ) then K (,) (θ ∧ φ) ⊆ K (,) φ. Suppose φ /∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Then [K (,) (θ ∧
φ)] ∩ [¬φ] = ∅, which means there exists w0 ∈ [¬φ] such that w0  w ′ for some w ′ ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). Since ⊆,
it follows that w0  w ′ for some w ′ ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). Since obviously w0 ∈ [¬(θ ∧ φ)], this implies w0 ∈ min([¬(θ ∧
φ)],). The existence of this w0 then implies min([¬φ],) ⊆ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],), for if w ∈ min([¬φ],) then w  w0
and so, by transitivity of  and the fact that clearly also w ∈ [¬(θ ∧ φ)] we get w ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). That min([¬φ],)
⊆min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],) is enough then to prove [K (,) φ] ⊆ [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)], which gives the result. 
Now we show (B1)–(B8) are complete. The following derived rules will be useful.
Lemma B. The following four properties follow from (B1)–(B8):
(X1) K  φ ⊆ K + ¬φ
(X2) If θ ∧ φ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ) then θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ ψ)
(X3) If θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) and θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ ψ) then θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ)
(X4) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then K  (θ ∧ φ) = K  φ
Proof. For (X1) recall that (B5′) is equivalent to (B5) by Proposition 5. Then from (B5′) we know K φ ⊆ (K (φ∧⊥))+¬φ.
(X1) then follows from applying to this (B3) (using φ ∧ ⊥ ≡ ⊥) followed by (B4) (i.e., K  ⊥ = K ).
For (X2) suppose θ ∧φ ∈ K  (θ ∧φ∧ψ). By (B1) and (B2) this means θ ∧ψ /∈ K  (θ ∧φ∧ψ). Using this with (B8) we get
K  (θ ∧φ ∧ψ) ⊆ K  (θ ∧ψ). Hence, since θ ∈ K  (θ ∧φ ∧ψ) (which follows from the assumption θ ∧φ ∈ K  (θ ∧φ ∧ψ)
and (B1)), we get θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ ψ) as required.
For (X3) suppose θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) and θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ ψ). From the latter we get θ ∧ φ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ) using (X2) above.
Hence, by (B8), K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ K  (θ ∧ φ) and so from θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) we get θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ) as required.
(X4) is a straightforward consequence from mainly (B6) and (B8). 
Now let’s give the completeness proof of Theorem 6.
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one from Deﬁnition 3 of the paper, which we denoted by C(K ,). Recall we deﬁne the two relations , on W from K
and  as follows:
() w1  w2 iff ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2)
() w1  w2 iff ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2
Recall that in ¬w1, etc., world w1 stands for any sentence which has w1 as its only model. Note that, here and in what
follows, the precise choice of which sentence is irrelevant thanks to (B1) and (B3).
We now need to show several things: (1)  is a total pre-order on W , anchored on [K ], (2)  is a reﬂexive sub-relation
of , (3) K  φ = K (,) φ for all φ.
(1)  is a total pre-order on W, anchored on [K ]. To show  is a total pre-order we need to show  is transitive
and complete. First we show transitivity. So suppose w1  w2 and w2  w3, i.e., ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) and ¬w2 /∈
K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w3). We need to show w1  w3, i.e., ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w3). Equivalently we can show that if ¬w1 ∈
K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w3) and ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w3) then ¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). But from ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w3)
we get ¬w1 ∧ ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2 ∧ ¬w3) by rule (X2) in Lemma B. Hence, by (B8), K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2 ∧ ¬w3) ⊆
K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2). Meanwhile from ¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧¬w3) we deduce ¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2 ∧¬w3) from (B5). Using
this with K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2 ∧ ¬w3) ⊆ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) gives the required ¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2).
To show  is complete we need to show either w1  w2 or w2  w1, i.e., either ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) or ¬w2 /∈
K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w1). This follows easily from (B1) and (B2).
It remains to show  is anchored on [K ], i.e., min(W,) = [K ]. Let w ∈ min(W,). Then ¬w /∈ K  (¬w ∧¬w ′) for all
w ′ ∈ W . By repeated use of rule (X3) from Lemma B we obtain from this ¬w /∈ K ∧w ′∈W ¬w ′ . Since ⊥ ≡∧w ′∈W ¬w ′ this
gives ¬w /∈ K ⊥ by (B3). Hence, since K ⊥ = K by (B4), this gives in turn ¬w /∈ K , which is equivalent to w ∈ [K ]. Thus
we have shown min(W,) ⊆ [K ]. For the converse direction suppose w /∈min(W,). Then ¬w ∈ K (¬w∧¬w ′) for some
w ′ ∈ W . Using this with (X1) gives ¬w ∈ K + (w ∨ w ′), equivalently (w ∨ w ′) → ¬w ∈ K . Since ¬w ≡ ((w ∨ w ′) → ¬w),
this is equivalent to ¬w ∈ K , i.e., w /∈ [K ] as required.
(2)  is a reﬂexive sub-relation of . First, to show  is reﬂexive we need to show ¬w /∈ K  ¬w for all w ∈ W . This
is immediate from (B2). To show  is a sub-relation of  we need to show w1  w2 implies w1  w2. We show the
contrapositive. So suppose w1  w2. Since we have already shown above that  is connected, this means we must have
w2  w1, i.e., ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). Hence, by (B8), K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) ⊆ K  ¬w2. Our assumption w1  w2 yields
¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), and so using this with K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) ⊆ K  ¬w2 gives ¬w1 ∈ K  ¬w2, i.e., w1  w2 as
required.
(3) K  φ = K (,) φ for all φ. Let φ ∈ L. We will show [K  φ] = {w | w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],)}. Let
[¬φ] = {x1, . . . , xm} and let S = {i | xi ∈min([¬φ],)}. We will ﬁrst show
K  φ = K 
∧
i∈S
¬xi .
To see this ﬁrst note that K  φ = K  ∧mi=1 ¬xi = K  (∧i∈S ¬xi) ∧ (∧ j /∈S ¬x j) by (B3). Now let j /∈ S . Then we know
there exists i ∈ S such that xi < x j (otherwise j ∈ S), so ¬x j ∈ K  (¬xi ∧ ¬x j) for some i ∈ S . Using this with (B5) gives
¬x j ∈ K  (∧i∈S ¬xi) ∧ (∧i /∈S ¬xi). Since this holds for each j /∈ S we obtain ∧ j /∈S ¬x j ∈ K  (∧i∈S ¬xi) ∧ (∧ j /∈S ¬x j) by
(B1). Hence, from rule (X4) in Lemma B, we get K  (
∧
i∈S ¬xi)∧ (
∧
j ∈S ¬x j) = K 
∧
i∈S ¬xi , i.e., K  φ = K 
∧
i∈S ¬xi as
required.
Now suppose w ∈ [K φ]. We must show there exists i ∈ S such that w  xi . But from w ∈ [K  φ] we get ¬w /∈ K  φ.
From the above, this is the same as ¬w /∈ K ∧i∈S ¬xi . By (B7) this means we must have ¬w /∈ K  ¬xi for some i ∈ S ,
i.e., w  xi as required.
For the converse direction, choose i ∈ S such that w  xi . Then ¬w /∈ K ¬xi . Now, for all i′ ∈ S such that i′ = i we have
xi  xi′ , i.e., ¬xi /∈ K (¬xi ∧¬xi′ ). By repeated application of rule (X3) from Lemma B we obtain ¬xi /∈ K ∧i′∈S ¬xi′ . Hence,
from (B8), K 
∧
i′∈S ¬xi′ ⊆ K ¬xi . Since ¬w /∈ K ¬xi , this gives us ¬w /∈ K 
∧
i′∈S ¬xi′ = K  φ, and so w ∈ [K  φ] as
required. 
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 3
Proposition 9.
(i) If (,) is transitive then (,) satisﬁes:
(BTran) If K  θ ⊆ (K  φ) + ¬φ then K  θ ⊆ K  φ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BTran) then the relation  of C(K ,) is transitive.
Proof. (i) Suppose K (,) θ ⊆ (K (,) φ)+¬φ, equivalently [K (,) φ]∩[¬φ] ⊆ [K (,) θ], and let w ∈ [K (,) φ].
We must show w ∈ [K (,) θ]. But from w ∈ [K (,) φ] we know w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],). By reﬂexivity
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we deduce w ′ ∈ [K (,) θ], i.e., w ′  w ′′ for some w ′′ ∈min([¬θ],). Then by transitivity of  we get also w  w ′′ and
so w ∈ [K (,) θ] as required.
(ii) Suppose ¬w /∈ K  ¬w ′ and ¬w ′ ∈ K  ¬w ′′ . Using (B1) this is equivalent to w ∈ [K  ¬w ′] and w ′ ∈ [K  ¬w ′′].
We must show w ∈ [K  ¬w ′′]. But from w ′ ∈ [K  ¬w ′′] and the fact [w ′] = {w} we know [K  ¬w ′] ∩ [w ′] ⊆ [K  ¬w ′′].
Applying (BTran) to this yields [K  ¬w ′] ⊆ [K  ¬w ′′] (with a little help from (B1)) from which we obtain the required
w ∈ [K  ¬w ′′] from w ∈ [K  ¬w ′]. 
Proposition 10. Any removal operator which satisﬁes (BTran) and (B5′) also satisﬁes (B6).
Proof. Suppose θ ∈ K  (θ ∧φ). To show K φ ⊆ K  (θ ∧φ) it suﬃces by (BTran) to show K φ ⊆ (K  (θ ∧φ))+¬(θ ∧φ).
But from the assumption θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) we know (K  (θ ∧ φ))+¬(θ ∧ φ) = (K  (θ ∧ φ))+¬φ, which contains K  φ by
(B5′) as required. 
Recall the condition (a) on (,):
(a) If w1 ∼ w2 and w1  w2 then w2  w1
Proposition 11.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (a) then (,) satisﬁes:
(BPriority) If θ ∈ K  φ and φ /∈ K  θ then θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BPriority) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (a).
Proof. (i) Suppose θ ∈ K (,) φ, φ /∈ K (,) θ and, for contradiction, θ /∈ K (,) (φ ∧ θ). Then from φ /∈ K (,) θ we
know from (B1) that [K (,) θ]  [φ] and so there exist w1,w2 such that w1 ∈ [¬φ], w1  w2 and w2 ∈ min([¬θ],),
while from θ /∈ K (,) (φ ∧ θ) we know there exist z,w such that z ∈ [¬θ], z  w and w ∈ min([¬(φ ∧ θ)],). We have
the following inequalities:
w  w1  w2  z w.
To see this, note w1  w2 and z w are both given, w  w1 follows since w1 ∈ [¬φ] and the minimality of w , while w2 
z follows from z ∈ [¬θ] and the minimality of w2. Since ⊆ this yields w  w1  w2  z  w , thus w ∼ w1 ∼ w2 ∼ z,
and in particular w1 ∼ w2. Using this with w1  w2 and property (a) yields w2  w1. Now, the above proved inequality
also gives w1  w , which using the minimality of w is enough to show w1 ∈ min([¬φ],). Hence w2 ∈ [K (,) φ]. But
w2 ∈ [¬θ], contradicting θ ∈ K (,) φ.
(ii) We will show w1  w2 and w2  w1 implies w1 < w2. So suppose w1  w2 and w2  w1, i.e., by deﬁnition of
C(K ,), ¬w1 /∈ K ¬w2 and ¬w2 ∈ K ¬w1. Then applying (BPriority) (and (B3)) to this gives ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2),
or w1 < w2 as required. 
Proposition 12.
(i) If (,) is both transitive and satisﬁes (a) then (,) satisﬁes:
(BConserv) If K  θ ⊆ K  φ then there exists λ ∈ L∗ such that φ  λ and (K  θ) ∪ (K  λ)  φ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BConserv) then C(K ,) is transitive and satisﬁes (a).
Proof. (i) Let (,) be a transitive context which satisﬁes (a). Suppose K (,) θ  K (,) φ. Then since (,)
satisﬁes (BTran) by Proposition 9(i) we know K (,) θ  (K (,) φ) + ¬φ. Now let (φ) ∈ L, resp. (θ), denote some
sentence such that K (,) φ = Cn((φ)), resp. K (,) θ = Cn((θ)). So from K (,) θ  (K (,) φ)+¬φ we know
(φ) ∧ ¬φ  (θ). Let λ = ¬((φ) ∧ ¬φ ∧ ¬  (θ)). Then we know λ ∈ L∗ and φ  λ. We will show (λ) ∧ (θ)  φ,
which will suﬃce. Let w1 ∈ [(λ) ∧ (θ)]. We must show w1 ∈ [φ]. But from w1 ∈ [(λ)] we know w1  w2 for some
w2 ∈min([¬λ],). Since w2 ∈ [¬λ] and by deﬁnition of λ we know w2 ∈ [(φ)∧¬φ] = [K (,) φ] ∩ [¬φ] and so, w2 ∈
min([¬φ],) by Lemma A. Now suppose for contradiction w1 ∈ [¬φ]. Then the minimality of w2 gives w2  w1. Using
this with w1  w2 and (a) yields w2  w1. Now since also w1 ∈ [(θ)] we know w1  w3 for some w3 ∈ min([¬θ],).
So from this and transitivity we obtain w2  w3 and thus w2 ∈ [(θ)]. But, looking at the deﬁnition of λ, this contradicts
w2 ∈ [¬λ]. Hence w1 ∈ [φ] as required.
(ii) To show  is transitive we need to show that if ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2 and ¬w2 /∈ K  ¬w3 then ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w3.
Equivalently, if ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2 and ¬w1 ∈ K  ¬w3 then ¬w2 ∈ K  ¬w3. But if ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2 and ¬w1 ∈ K  ¬w3
then K  ¬w3 ⊆ K  ¬w2. Hence, by (BConserv), there exists λ ∈ L∗ such that ¬w2  λ and (K  ¬w3) ∪ (K  λ)  ¬w2.
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than ¬w2 are the tautologies). So, using (B3), K  λ = K  ¬w2. Hence we may rewrite (K  ¬w3) ∪ (K  λ)  ¬w2 as
(K  ¬w3) ∪ (K  ¬w2)  ¬w2, which in turn is equivalent to:
[K  ¬w3] ∩ [K  ¬w2] ⊆ [¬w2]. (B.1)
Clearly w2 /∈ [¬w2], which from the above means w2 cannot be an element of both [K ¬w3] and [K ¬w2]. By (B2) we
know ¬w2 /∈ K  ¬w2, i.e., w2 ∈ [K  ¬w2]. Hence it must be that w2 /∈ [K  ¬w3], i.e., ¬w2 ∈ K  ¬w3 as required.
It remains to show condition (a) is satisﬁed. So suppose w1 ∼ w2 and w1  w2. We must show w2  w1. In fact we
will show that [w1 ∼ w2 and w2  w1] implies w1  w2. So suppose w1 ∼ w2 and w2  w1, i.e., ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧
¬w2), ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w1) and ¬w2 ∈ K  ¬w1. Then since ¬w2 ∈ (K  ¬w1) \ (K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w1)) we know
K  ¬w1 ⊆ K  (¬w2 ∧ ¬w1), so we may apply (BConserv) to deduce the existence of λ ∈ L∗ such that ¬w2 ∧ ¬w1  λ
and (K  ¬w1) ∪ (K  λ)  ¬w2 ∧ ¬w1. Since obviously w1 /∈ [¬w2 ∧ ¬w1], this latter implies in particular that w1 /∈
[K  ¬w1] ∩ [K  λ]. And since we know w1 ∈ [K  ¬w1] by (B2), we deduce from this w1 /∈ [K  λ], i.e., ¬w1 ∈ K  λ.
Now, since ¬w2 ∧¬w1  λ and λ is not a tautology, it must be the case that either (i) λ ≡ ¬w1 ∧¬w2, or (ii) λ ≡ ¬w1, or
(iii) λ ≡ ¬w2. We show (i) and (ii) lead to contradictions, leaving (iii) as the only possibility, from which we then deduce
¬w1 ∈ K  ¬w2 (using (B3)), i.e., w1  w2 as required. But if (i) holds then ¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), contradicting our
initial assumption w1 ∼ w2, while if (ii) holds then ¬w1 ∈ K  ¬w1, contradicting (B2). This completes the proof. 
Recall the postulate (BSConserv):
(BSConserv) If K  θ ⊆ K  φ then (K  θ) ∪ (K  φ)  φ
and the condition (b) on (,):
(b) If w1 ∼ w2 then w1  w2
Proposition 13.
(i) If (,) is transitive and satisﬁes (b) then (,) satisﬁes (BSConserv).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (BSConserv) then C(K ,) is transitive and satisﬁes (b).
Proof. (i) Suppose (,) is transitive and satisﬁes (b), and suppose K (,) θ ⊆ K (,) φ. Since (,) satisﬁes (BTran)
by Proposition 9(i) this implies K (,) θ  (K (,) φ)+¬φ. Hence there exists w ′ such that w ′ ∈ [K (,) φ]∩[¬φ] but
w ′ /∈ [K (,) θ]. We must show [K (,) θ]∩[K (,) φ] ⊆ [φ]. Suppose for contradiction there exists w ∈ [K (,) θ]∩
[K (,) φ]∩[¬φ]. Then both w and w ′ are elements of [K (,) φ]∩[¬φ] =min([¬φ],) by Lemma A, so w ∼ w ′ which
implies w ′  w by (b). Meanwhile from w ∈ [K (,) θ] we know w  w ′′ for some w ′′ ∈ min([¬θ],). By transitivity of
 we deduce w ′  w ′′ and so w ′ ∈ [K (,) θ], giving the required contradiction.
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (BSConserv). Since (BSConserv) clearly implies (BConserv), we know (,) is transitive by
Proposition 12(ii). It remains to show (b) holds. To show w1 ∼ w2 implies w1  w2 we need to show that if ¬w1 /∈
K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2) and ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w2 ∧¬w1) then ¬w1 /∈ K ¬w2. But if ¬w1 ∈ (K ¬w2) \ (K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2)) then
K  ¬w2 ⊆ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), so we may apply (BSConserv) to deduce (K  ¬w2) ∪ (K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2))  ¬w1 ∧ ¬w2.
Since w2 /∈ [¬w1 ∧¬w2], this gives us w2 /∈ [K ¬w2] ∩ [K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2)]. But we know w2 ∈ [K ¬w2] by (B2), hence
we must have w2 /∈ [K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2)], i.e., ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). 
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 4
Proposition 14. Let  be a basic removal operator for K , then  satisﬁes: If φ /∈ K then K ⊆ K  φ .
Proof. First note that by (B3) and (B4), K = K  (⊥ ∧ φ). The rule then follows as an instance of (B8) (substitute ⊥ for θ
there). 
Proposition 15.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (c) then (,) satisﬁes (Vacuity).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Vacuity) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (c).
Proof. (i) Suppose (,) satisﬁes (c). We only need to show the ‘missing half ’ of (Vacuity): If φ /∈ K then K (,) φ ⊆ K .
So suppose φ /∈ K . Then there exists w0 ∈ [K ] ∩ [¬φ]. Since  is anchored on [K ], w0 ∈ min([¬φ],). Since w0 ∈ [K ], we
know by (c) that w  w0 for all w ∈ [K ]. Thus every world in [K ] is -below some element of min([¬φ],) (namely w0).
Hence [K ] ⊆ [K (,) φ] which gives the required conclusion.
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K , i.e., [K ] ⊆ [K  ¬w2]. Using this with w1 ∈ [K ] yields w1 ∈ [K  ¬w2], which entails the required ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2. 
Recall the deﬁnition of ÷′ from :
K ÷′ φ =
{
K if φ /∈ K ,
K  φ otherwise.
Proposition 16. If (,) is the K -context corresponding to , then the K -context corresponding to ÷′ deﬁned above is (,′),
where ′ is obtained from by setting w1 ′ w2 iff w1  w2 or w1,w2 ∈ [K ].
Proof. First consider the case φ /∈ K . In this case by Proposition 14 we already know K ⊆ K (,′) φ, so we just need to
show K (,′) φ ⊆ K , i.e., [K ] ⊆ [K (,′) φ]. So let w ∈ [K ]. Since φ /∈ K there exists w ′ ∈ [K ] ∩ [¬φ]. Clearly since 
is anchored on [K ] we must have w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],), while since w,w ′ ∈ [K ] we have w ′ w ′ from the deﬁnition of ′ .
Hence w ∈ K (,′) φ as required.
Now consider the case φ ∈ K . In this case we must show [K (,′) φ] = [K (,) φ]. The right-to-left inclusion is
immediate from the fact ⊆′ by deﬁnition of ′ . For the left-to-right inclusion suppose w ∈ [K (,′) φ]. Then w ′ w ′
for some w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],). Since w ′ ∈ [¬φ] and φ ∈ K we know w ′ /∈ [K ], so by deﬁnition of ′ we must have w  w ′ .
Hence w ∈ [K (,) φ] as required. 
Recall the deﬁnition of ′′ from : w1 ′′ w2 iff either w1  w2 or [w1 ∈ [K ] and w ′  w2 for some w ′ ∈ [K ]], and
recall that if  is the operator corresponding to (,), then V() is the operator corresponding to (,′′).
Proposition 17. Let  be a removal operator for K corresponding to K -context (,) and let ÷ = V(). Then
K ÷ φ =
{
K ∩ K  φ if K ∪ K  φ is consistent,
K  φ otherwise.
Proof. First consider the case K ∪ K φ is consistent, i.e., [K ] ∩ [K φ] = ∅. We must show K ÷φ = K ∩ K φ, equivalently
[K ÷ φ] = [K ] ∪ [K  φ]. For the left-to-right inclusion suppose w ∈ [K ÷ φ] and w /∈ [K ]. Then w ′′ w ′ for some w ′ ∈
min([¬φ],). Since w /∈ [K ] the deﬁnition of ′′ gives w  w ′ and so w ∈ [K φ] as required. For the right-to-left inclusion,
the fact [K ÷ φ] ⊇ [K  φ] is immediate from the fact ⊆′′ by deﬁnition of ′′ . It remains to prove [K ÷ φ] ⊇ [K ]. So
suppose w ∈ [K ]. Since we assume [K ] ∩ [K  φ] = ∅ there exists w0 ∈ [K ] ∩ [K  φ], i.e., w0 ∈ [K ] and w0  w ′ for some
w ′ ∈min([¬φ],). By deﬁnition of ′′ all this gives w ′′ w ′ and so w ∈ [K ÷ φ] as required.
Now consider the case [K ] ∩ [K  φ] = ∅. We must show [K ÷ φ] = [K  φ]. Once more the right-to-left inclusion is
immediate from ⊆′′ . For the converse direction suppose w ∈ [K ÷ φ]. Then w ′′ w ′ for some w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],). By
deﬁnition of ′′ we know either w  w ′ or [w ∈ [K ] and w ′′  w ′ for some w ′′ ∈ [K ]]. But this latter case would give
w ′′ ∈ [K ] ∩ [K  φ], contrary to our assumption [K ] ∩ [K  φ] = ∅. Hence we must be in the former case w  w ′ , which
implies w ∈ [K  φ] as required. 
Proposition 18.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (d) then (,) satisﬁes (Inclusion).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Inclusion) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (d).
Proof. (i) Suppose (,) satisﬁes (d). Then since every element of [K ] is -below every world in W , it is clear that
[K ] ⊆ [K (,) φ] for all φ, i.e., K (,) φ ⊆ K as required.
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (Inclusion) and suppose w1 ∈ [K ]. Let w2 ∈ W . Then [K ] ⊆ [K  ¬w2] by (Inclusion) so w1 ∈
[K  ¬w2], i.e., ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2. Thus w1  w2 as required. 
Recall that the incarceration −˙ of a removal operator  is deﬁned by setting, for each φ ∈ L∗ ,
K −˙ φ = K ∩ K  φ.
Proposition 19. If (,) is the K -context corresponding to , then the K -context corresponding to −˙ is (,′′), where ′′ is
obtained from  by setting w1 ′′ w2 iff w1  w2 or w1 ∈ [K ]. Furthermore:
(i) If  is transitive then so is ′′ .
(ii) If  satisﬁes (a) then so does ′′ .
(iii) If  satisﬁes (b) then so does ′′ .
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for some w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],). But from the deﬁnition of ′′ this latter is the same as saying that either w ∈ [K ] or w  w ′
for some w ′ ∈min([¬φ],), i.e., w ∈ [K ] ∪ [K (,) φ] as required.
(i) Suppose  is transitive and that w1 ′′ w2 and w2 ′′ w3. We must show w1 ′′ w3. If w1 ∈ [K ] then we get the
required conclusion, so suppose w1 ∈ [K ]. Then from w1 ′′ w2 we know w1  w2. Since w1 /∈ [K ] we must also have
w2 /∈ [K ] (because ⊆ so from w1  w2 we know w1  w2), and so from w2 ′′ w3 we get w2  w3. Hence we obtain
the desired w1  w3 by applying the transitivity of .
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (a) and suppose w1 ∼ w2 and w1 ′′ w2. We must show w2 ′′ w1. Note that, since w1 ∼ w2,
we have w1 ∈ [K ] iff w2 ∈ [K ]. If w2 ∈ [K ] then we obtain w2 ′′ w1 immediately, while if w2 /∈ [K ] then also w1 /∈ [K ],
and then the desired conclusion follows from the assumption that  satisﬁes (a).
(iii) Follows from similar reasoning to part (ii) above. 
Proposition 20.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (e) then (,) satisﬁes (Recovery).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Recovery) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (e).
Proof. For this proof, ﬁrst note the (Recovery) rule is equivalent to [K  φ] ∩ [φ] ⊆ [K ].
(i) Suppose (,) satisﬁes (e). Let w ∈ [K φ]∩ [φ]. Then, since w ∈ [K φ], w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈min([¬φ],). Since
w ∈ [φ] and w ′ ∈ [¬φ] we cannot have w = w ′ . Hence, by (e), w ∈ [K ] as required.
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (Recovery) and suppose w1  w2. Then w1 ∈ [K  ¬w2]. We need to show either w1 = w2 or
w1 ∈ [K ]. But if w1 = w2 then w1 ∈ [¬w2], and so we can conclude w1 ∈ [K ] using (Recovery). 
Proposition 21. The following are equivalent:
(i)  is a full AGM contraction operator (i.e., satisfying the basic and supplementary AGM postulates).
(ii)  satisﬁes (B1)–(B8) plus (Inclusion) and (Recovery).
(iii)  = (,) for some (,) which satisﬁes (d) and (e).
Proof. Recall that (d)+(e) speciﬁes  uniquely in terms of . Then equivalence (i) ⇔ (ii) follows from the well-established
representation results relating full AGM contraction to total pre-orders over worlds [4,5]. The equivalence (ii) ⇔ (iii) follows
from Theorem 6 and Propositions 18 and 20. 
Appendix D. Proofs for Section 5
Proposition 22.  is a linear liberation operator iff it is a basic removal operator which satisﬁes (Hyperreg).
Proof. We need to show the list of postulates for linear liberation is equivalent to (B1)–(B8) plus (Hyperreg). So ﬁrst
suppose (B1)–(B3) hold together with (Vacuity) and (Hyperreg). Then (B4) holds since it is implied by (Vacuity). To see
(B5) holds we show the contrapositive. So suppose θ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ). Then, by (B1), θ ∧ φ /∈ K  (θ ∧ φ ∧ ψ). Hence
K (θ ∧φ∧ψ) = K (θ ∧φ) by (Hyperreg), and so the desired θ /∈ K (θ ∧φ) follows. (B6) and (B8) follow straightforwardly
using (Hyperreg), while (B7) also holds easily, once it is noticed that the Decomposition property holds for all linear
liberation operators K  (θ ∧ φ) equals either K  θ or K  φ.
For the other direction it amounts to showing that the addition of (Hyperreg) to the basic removal postulates allows
the derivation of (Vacuity). This follows by noticing K = K  (⊥ ∧ φ) by (B3) and (B4). (Vacuity) is then seen to be just an
instance of (Hyperreg). 
Proposition 23.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (f) then (,) satisﬁes (Hyperreg).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Hyperreg) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (f).
Proof. (i) Suppose (,) satisﬁes (f) and suppose θ /∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Since (,) satisﬁes (B8), we already know
K (,) (θ ∧ φ) ⊆ K (,) θ , so it remains to show K (,) θ ⊆ K (,) (θ ∧ φ), equivalently [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)] ⊆
[K (,) θ]. But by the proof of (B8) in Theorem 6, we know if θ /∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ) then there exists some w0 ∈
[¬θ] ∩ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). Clearly then w0 ∈ min([¬θ],). Now let w ∈ [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)]. Then w  w ′ for some w ′ ∈
min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). Since w ′ ∼ w0 we may apply (f) to deduce w  w0, and so since w0 ∈ min([¬θ],) we get w ∈
[K (,) θ]. Hence [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)] ⊆ [K (,) θ] as required.
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (Hyperreg) and suppose w1 ∼ w2. This translates into ¬w1,¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2). From this
we know, using (Hyperreg), that K  ¬w1 and K  ¬w2 are both equal to K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). Hence for any w3 ∈ W ,
¬w3 /∈ K  ¬w1 iff ¬w3 /∈ K  ¬w2, i.e., w3  w1 iff w3  w2. Thus C(K ,) satisﬁes (f). 
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Proof. By results in [10] (see Corollary 3.19, p. 62 there),  is a σ -liberation operator iff it is a linear liberation operator
satisfying (BSConserv). From Proposition 22 this is the same as saying  is a basic removal operator satisfying (Hyperreg)
and (BSConserv). The result then follows by combining Theorem 6 with Propositions 13 and 23. 
Proposition 25. Let (,) be a transitive K -context. Then (,) satisﬁes (b) iff (,) satisﬁes (f).
Proof. Suppose (,) satisﬁes (f) and suppose w1 ∼ w2. Then since w1  w1 by reﬂexivity of , we may apply (f) to
deduce w1  w2. Thus (b) holds. Note this implication (f) ⇒ (b) holds even without assuming (,) is transitive. This
assumption is required for the converse implication: Suppose w1 ∼ w2 and w3  w1. From the former we get w1  w2
using (b) and so the desired w3  w2 follows from transitivity. 
Proposition 26. The following are equivalent:
(i)  is a σ -liberation operator.
(ii)  is a linear liberation operator which satisﬁes (BTran).
(iii)  is a basic removal operator which satisﬁes (BSConserv).
Proof. As stated in the text. 
Proposition 27.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (e′) then (,) satisﬁes (Dichotomy).
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (Dichotomy) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (e′).
Proof. For (i), observe ﬁrstly that if (,) satisﬁes (e′) then for every φ, it follows that for every w1,w2 ∈ [K  φ],
w1 ∼ w2. Now suppose that (K  θ) ∪ (K  φ)  ⊥. That means there is a w such that w ∈ [K  θ] and w ∈ [K  φ].
From the observation above it follows that for every w ′ ∈ [K  θ], w ′ ∼ w and for every w ′′ ∈ [K  φ], w ′′ ∼ w . And so
w ′ ∼ w ′′ for every w ′ ∈ [K  θ] and every w ′′ ∈ [K  φ]. From (e′) it then follows that [K  θ] = [K  φ], which means that
K  θ = K  φ.
For (ii), consider C(K ,) = (,) as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7. We need to show that w1  w2 iff w1 ∼ w2. So, suppose
ﬁrst that w1  w2. That is, ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2. From this it follows that w1 ∈ [K  ¬w2]. By (B2) it follows that w1 ∈
[K  ¬w1]. From the combination of these two results it follows that (K  ¬w1) ∪ (K  w2)  ⊥, and by (Dichotomy) we
then have that K  ¬w1 = K  ¬w2. We can distinguish between two cases:
Case 1. K  ¬w1 = K  ¬w2 = K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2): In this case we immediately get that ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), from
which it follows that w1  w2, and we get that ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2), from which it follows that w2  w1. This means
w1 ∼ w2, which is what we wanted to prove.
Case 2. (K  ¬w1 = K  ¬w2) = K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2): In this case it follows by (Dichotomy) that (K  ¬w1) ∪ (K  (¬w1 ∧
¬w2))  ⊥ and (K  ¬w2)∪ (K  (¬w1 ∧¬w2))  ⊥. Since we know that w1 ∈ [K  ¬w1] and w2 ∈ [K  ¬w2] it follows
that w1 /∈ [K  ¬w1 ∧ ¬w2] and w2 /∈ [K  ¬w1 ∧ ¬w2]. So ¬w1 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) and ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), and
by (B1) we then have ¬w1 ∧ ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), which contradicts (B2).
So, we have shown that in Case 1 the desired results follow, and that Case 2 cannot occur, which means we have shown
that if w1  w2 then w1 ∼ w2.
Now suppose that w1 ∼ w2. That is, ¬w1 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) and ¬w2 /∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). So w1 ∈ [K  (¬w1 ∧
¬w2)] and w2 ∈ [K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2)]. By (B2) it also follows that w1 ∈ [K  ¬w1] and w2 ∈ [K  ¬w2]. This means that
(K  ¬w1) ∪ (K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2))  ⊥ and that (K  ¬w2) ∪ (K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2))  ⊥, and by (Dichotomy) it then follows
that K  ¬w1 = K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2) and K  ¬w2 = K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). Therefore ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2, which means that
w1  w2. 
Proposition 28. The following are equivalent:
(i)  is a dichotomous liberation operator.
(ii)  satisﬁes (B1)–(B8) plus (Dichotomy).
(iii)  = (,) for some (,) which satisﬁes (e′).
Proof. As stated in the text. 
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Proposition 29.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (g) then (,) satisﬁes:
(B9) If θ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ) then φ ∈ K  θ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B9) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (g).
Proof. (i) Suppose (,) satisﬁes (g) and suppose θ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ). Let w0 ∈ min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],). Then, as we saw in
the proof of (B5), this means w ∈ [θ] for all w  w0. This implies (1) w0 ∈ [¬φ] and (2) w0 < w ′ for all w ′ ∈min([¬θ],).
Using (g), this latter implies w0  w ′ for all w ′ ∈ min([¬θ],) and so in fact w0 ∈ [K (,) θ]. From this and (1) we
conclude φ /∈ K (,) θ .
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (B9) and suppose w1 < w2. Then ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2). Applying (B9) to this gives ¬w1 /∈
K  ¬w2, i.e., w1  w2 as required. 
Proposition 30.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (h) then (,) satisﬁes:
(B10) If  (θ ∨ φ) and θ /∈ K  φ then φ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B10) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (h).
Proof. (i) Suppose (,) satisﬁes (h) and suppose  (θ ∨φ) and θ /∈ K (,) φ. Then [¬θ]∩[K (,) φ] = ∅ so there exist
w ∈ [¬θ] and w ′ ∈ min([¬φ],) such that w  w ′ . Since  (θ ∨ φ) and w ′ ∈ [¬φ] we know w ′ ∈ [θ]. Hence w = w ′ so, by
(h), w < w ′ . Now let w0 ∈ [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)]. We will show w0 ∈ [φ]. But w0 ∈ [K (,) (θ ∧ φ)] implies w0  w ′′—and
hence w0  w ′′—for some w ′′ ∈min([¬(θ ∧φ)],). Since w ∈ [¬(θ ∧φ)] this gives w0  w and so, since w < w ′ , w0 < w ′ .
We conclude w0 ∈ [φ] from this using w ′ ∈min([¬φ],). Hence we have shown [K (,) ¬(θ ∧φ)] ⊆ [φ], which gives the
required φ ∈ K (,) ¬(θ ∧ φ).
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (B10) and let w1  w2, i.e., ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2. If w1 = w2 we are done, so suppose w1 = w2.
Then  (¬w1 ∨ ¬w2), so we may apply (B10) to deduce ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2), i.e., w1 < w2 as required. 
Proposition 31.
(i) If (,) satisﬁes (j) then (,) satisﬁes:
(B11) If  (θ ∨ φ) and θ ∈ K \ K  φ then φ ∈ K  (θ ∧ φ)
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B11) then C(K ,) satisﬁes (j).
Proof. (i) Suppose  (θ ∨φ) and θ ∈ K \ K (,) φ. From θ /∈ K (,) φ we know there exists w0 ∈ [¬θ] such that w0  w
for some w ∈ min([¬φ],). We now claim w0 < w . Firstly, since w0 ∈ [¬θ] and  (θ ∨ φ) we know w0 ∈ [φ] and so, since
w ∈ [¬φ], we know w0 = w . Secondly, since θ ∈ K we know [K ] ⊆ [θ] and so w0 /∈ [K ]. Applying (j) to these two with
w0  w proves the desired w0 < w . From this we deduce the -minimal ¬θ -worlds must be strictly below the -minimal
¬φ-worlds in , which implies min([¬(θ ∧ φ)],) ⊆ [φ]. This is enough to imply φ ∈ K (,) (θ ∧ φ).
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (B11). To show (j) suppose w1  w2, i.e., ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2. Suppose also w1 = w2 and that it is
not the case that w1  w ′ for all w ′ , i.e., w1 /∈ [K ]. We must show then w1 < w2. But from w1 = w2 we get  (¬w1∨¬w2)
while from w1 /∈ [K ] we get ¬w1 ∈ K . Applying (B11) to these two and ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2 gives ¬w2 ∈ K  (¬w1 ∧ ¬w2),
i.e., w1 < w2 as required. 
Proposition 32. The following are equivalent:
(i) −˙ is a systematic withdrawal.
(ii) −˙ satisﬁes (B1)–(B8) plus (Vacuity), (B9) and (B11).
(iii) −˙ = (,) for some (,) which satisﬁes (c), (g) and (j).
Proof. To prove (i) ⇔ (iii) recall from [11] that −˙ is a systematic withdrawal iff there is some total pre-order  over W
such that
K −˙ φ = K ∩ Th(∇(min([¬φ],))),
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of  via
w1  w2 iff w1 ∈ [K ] or w1 = w2 or w1 < w2.
To see this note that the left-to-right implication is exactly (j). For the converse we have w1 = w2 implies w1  w2 by
reﬂexivity of  and w1 < w2 implies w1  w2 by (g). It remains to show w1 ∈ [K ] implies w1  w2. But if w2 ∈ [K ] then
the desired conclusion follows from (c), while if w2 /∈ [K ] then w1 < w2 and it follows from (g). Given this, item (iii) of the
proposition is the same as saying there exists some total pre-order  over W such that
[K −˙ φ] = [K ] ∪ {v ∈ W ∣∣ ∃w ∈min([¬φ],) s.t. v = w or v < w}
= [K ] ∪ ∇
(
min
([¬φ],)),
from which we can see that (i) and (iii) are saying the same thing.
The equivalence (ii) ⇔ (iii) follows from Theorem 6 along with Propositions 15, 29 and 31. 
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Proposition 33.
(i) If  is the equality relation then (,) satisﬁes:
(B12) ¬φ ∈ K  φ
(ii) If  is a removal operator satisfying (B12) then  in C(K ,) is the equality relation.
Proof. (i) If  is the equality relation then clearly [K (,) φ] =min([¬φ],) and so ¬φ ∈ K (,) φ as required.
(ii) Suppose  satisﬁes (B12). To show  in C(K ,) is the equality relation we need to show ¬w1 /∈ K  ¬w2 implies
w1 = w2. But we know by (B12) that [K  ¬w2] = {w2}. Hence if w1 = w2 then w1 /∈ [K  ¬w2] which means ¬w1 ∈
K  ¬w2 as required. 
Proposition 34. If  is a basic removal operator then R() is an AGM revision operator.
Proof. Suppose  is generated by K -context (,). Then K × φ is determined entirely by the total pre-order  via [K ×
φ] = min([φ],). The fact that × is an AGM revision operator then follows from well-established results linking AGM
revision with total pre-orders over the set of worlds [4,5]. 
Proposition 35. Let (,) be a K -context. Then = iff both (f) and (g) are satisﬁed.
Proof. Let (,) be a K -context. Suppose =. Then (f) reduces to the property “[w1 ∼ w2 and w3  w1] implies
w3  w2”, which clearly holds by transitivity of , while (g) reduces to the property “w1 < w2 implies w1  w2”, which
holds trivially. Conversely suppose (,) satisﬁes both (f) and (g). We want to show =. By deﬁnition of K -context we
already have ⊆. For the converse inclusion suppose w1  w2. If in fact w1 < w2 then we obtain the desired w1  w2 by
(g). So suppose w1 ∼ w2. Since  is reﬂexive we know w1  w1. Applying (f) to these two gives w1  w2 as required. 
Proposition 36. −˙ is a severe withdrawal operator iff it satisﬁes (B1)–(B4), (Hyperreg) and (B9).
Proof. By results in [12] we know −˙ is a severe withdrawal operator iff −˙ = (,) where =. Then the result follows
from combining Theorem 6 and Propositions 23, 29 and 35. (Recall (Hyperreg) implies (B5)–(B8) given the fundamental
rules (B1)–(B4).) 
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